A game-theoretic model of curriculum integration and school leadership

Abstract

This paper analyzes a simple game-theoretic model of curriculum integration decision-making in a high school with academic and vocational tracks. The model is based on a formal theory of how curriculum integration affects learning. Teachers choose to include a curriculum integration unit in their classes only when it increases learning relative to the next best alternative. The analysis shows that (1) curriculum integration is not invariably the right choice for schools; (2) teachers may independently choose curriculum integration under certain circumstances; (3) teachers' independent choices about curriculum integration may or may not be optimal from a school-wide perspective; and (4) school leadership is called for when teacher choices are suboptimal. © 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords

Author Keywords

human capital Resource allocation Efficiency Educational economics

Index Keywords

leadership Game theory

Author Affiliations

Department of Economics, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, United States

Funding & Acknowledgements

U.S. Department of Education, ED

This research was funded by the Office of the Institute of Education Sciences of the US Department of Education through a grant to the Mid-Atlantic Regional Education Laboratory, the Laboratory for Student Success at Temple University (LSS). The conclusions reached and the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the positions of the supporting agencies, and no official endorsement should be inferred. The author wishes to thank Andrew Buck and William Holmes for deep thoughts on game theory; Mikhail Kouliavtsev and Elizabeth Wheaton for outstanding research assistance; Mark Rohland and Stacey Bleistein for detailed editorial advice; the LSS Technical Review Board and two anonymous referees for valuable comments; and LSS Executive Directors JoAnn Manning, John Kovach, and Marilyn Murphy for support and encouragement.

Temple University, TU

This research was funded by the Office of the Institute of Education Sciences of the US Department of Education through a grant to the Mid-Atlantic Regional Education Laboratory, the Laboratory for Student Success at Temple University (LSS). The conclusions reached and the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the positions of the supporting agencies, and no official endorsement should be inferred. The author wishes to thank Andrew Buck and William Holmes for deep thoughts on game theory; Mikhail Kouliavtsev and Elizabeth Wheaton for outstanding research assistance; Mark Rohland and Stacey Bleistein for detailed editorial advice; the LSS Technical Review Board and two anonymous referees for valuable comments; and LSS Executive Directors JoAnn Manning, John Kovach, and Marilyn Murphy for support and encouragement.

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A game-theoretic model of curriculum integration and school leadership

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