What signals do employers use when hiring? Evidence from a survey experiment in the apprenticeship market

Abstract

How do employers use different types of signals - that is, information believed to be associated with productivity - when hiring apprentices? We use a survey experiment in Switzerland - a country with a well-developed dual training system - to study employers' hiring behaviour. The results reveal that whenever possible, employers resort to direct signals, i.e. information such as educational credentials and aptitude test scores, when making hiring decisions. However, in contexts of high uncertainty, notably, when candidates' profiles convey ambiguous signals, they are more likely to use probabilistic signals, such as socio-economic status (SES) indicators, to complement their assessments. Consequently, in contexts of high uncertainty, candidates with lower SES are more likely to be discriminated against in the apprenticeship market. © The Author(s) 2020.

Keywords

Author Keywords

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Index Keywords

Author Affiliations

Department for Social Policy, Université de Lausanne (UNIL), Lausanne, VD, Switzerland

Department for Inequality and Integration, Université de Lausanne (UNIL), Lausanne, VD, Switzerland

Funding & Acknowledgements

Singapore Eye Research Institute, SERI

This article was written in the framework of the Governance of Vocational and Professional Education and Training (GOVPET) project, which is financed by the State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI). The manuscript also benefitted from the financial support of the nccr-on the move Project IP 7, which is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation.

Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung, SNF

This article was written in the framework of the Governance of Vocational and Professional Education and Training (GOVPET) project, which is financed by the State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI). The manuscript also benefitted from the financial support of the nccr-on the move Project IP 7, which is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation.

Staatssekretariat für Bildung, Forschung und Innovation, SBFI

This article was written in the framework of the Governance of Vocational and Professional Education and Training (GOVPET) project, which is financed by the State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI). The manuscript also benefitted from the financial support of the nccr-on the move Project IP 7, which is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation.

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What signals do employers use when hiring? Evidence from a survey experiment in the apprenticeship market

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